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Allan Flanders

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3. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Industrial Democracy*, Longmans, 1902 edn., p. 271.
4. J. B. S. Hardman, *American Labor Dynamics*, Harcourt Brace, 1928, p. 111.
5. *ibid.*
6. *Labour Party Conference Report, 1956*, p. 82.
7. John Kenneth Galbraith, *The New Industrial State*, Hamish Hamilton, 1967, p. 262 and p. 282.
8. Perry Anderson, 'The Limits and Possibilities of Trade Union Action', *The Incompatibles* (ed. R. Blackburn and A. Cockburn), Penguin Special, 1967, pp. 264–5.
9. *ibid.*, pp. 266–7.
10. Will Herberg, 'Bureaucracy and Democracy in Labor Unions', *The Antioch Review*, Autumn 1943.
11. Michael Shanks, *The Stagnant Society*, Penguins, 1961, p. 115.
12. *Fair Deal At Work*, Conservative Political Centre, April 1968, p. 63.
13. G. D. H. Cole, *Short History of the British Working Class Movement 1789–1937*, Allen and Unwin 1937 edn., p. 12.

ON MANAGEMENT

1. Subsequently published as *The Fawley Productivity Agreements*, Faber, 1964.
2. W. E. J. McCarthy and S. R. Parker, *Shop Stewards and Workshop Relations*, Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations, Research Papers 10, HMSO, 1968, p. 50.
3. See Peter B. Doeringer, 'Determinants of the Structure of Industrial Type Internal Labor Markets', *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, January 1967.
4. R. Marriott, *Incentive Payment Systems*, Staples, 1957, p. 18.
5. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Industrial Democracy*, Longmans, 1902 edn., pp. 286–7.
6. 'Incentive Pay Systems', *Ministry of Labour Gazette*, July 1966.
7. J. R. Crossley, 'Collective Bargaining, Wage Structure and the Labour Markets in the United Kingdom', *Wage Structure in Theory and*

Practice (ed. E. M. Hugh Jones) North Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam, 1966.
8. S. Alderson, 'Incentives–Do they Work?' *Twentieth Century*, Summer 1964, p. 164.
9. See National Board for Prices and Incomes, *Report No. 65* (*Supplement*), Paper 1, 'A Review of the Literature on Payment by Results', Cmnd. 3627–I, HMSO, 1968.
10. See P. J. D. Cooke, 'How to Learn from Curves', *Management Today*, November 1967.
11. For a summary statement see H. Behrend, 'Financial Incentives as the Expression of a System of Beliefs', *British Journal of Sociology*, June 1959.
12. S. H. Slichter *et al.*, *The Impact of Collective Bargaining on Management*, Brookings Institution, 1960, p. 497.
13. Liesl Klein, *Multiproducts Ltd.*, HMSO, 1964, p. 143.
14. See his mimeographed paper, *Paper 1: Introduction* for the International Management Seminar on Forms of Wage and Salary Payment for High Productivity, OECD, Paris, 1967, p. 11.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE SYSTEM?

1. John T. Dunlop, *Industrial Relations Systems*, Holt, 1958, p. 6. 1958, p. 6.
2. *ibid.*, pp. 13–16.
3. Occasionally agreements attach 'personal' rates to individuals which disappear with their relinquishing of the job. This device is usually employed to facilitate the transition to a more ordered wage structure.
4. See R. Maciver and C. H. Page, *Society–An Introductory Analysis*, Macmillan, 1953, p. 474.
5. Peter Drucker, *The New Society*, Heinemann, 1951, p. 27.
6. T. Lupton's study of two workshop situations (*On The Shop Floor*, Pergamon Press, 1963) showed that in one (the Wye Garment Company) the workers' social groups had no behavioural norms relating to output and earnings.
7. This implies the possibility of conflict between these ends, but not its necessity. Managerial employees, because of the identification of their career interests with the success of the enterprise, may use their informal organisation to counteract the shortcomings of its formal organisation.
8. As Drucker explains: 'Its existence does not rest on the needs and purposes of the enterprise but on the needs and purposes of the members as human beings. Management can neither make the plant community nor abolish it; it is spontaneous and irrepressible in every enterprise.' *op. cit.*, p. 263.

9. Although the primary unit of organisation within the plant community is often described as a 'work group' this is a complex phenomenon. Leonard R. Sayles (in *Behaviour of Industrial Work Groups*, Wiley, 1958, pp. 144–61) distinguishes 'friendship cliques, work teams and pressure or interest groups' with overlapping memberships.
10. Sidney and Beatrice Webb summed up the 'fundamental object' of trade unionism as 'the deliberate regulation of the conditions of employment in such a way as to ward off from the manual-working producers the evil effects of industrial competition'. (*Industrial Democracy*, Longmans, 1902 ed., p. 807.)
11. William M. Leiserson, *American Trade Union Democracy*, Columbia U.P., 1959, p. 17.
12. See Dunlop, *op. cit.*, pp. 16–18.
13. In the case of state regulation they may be consulted by the government and affect the content of the rules as political pressure groups, but the responsibility for authorship rests with the government.
14. This is not to be confused with unilateral regulation by union *members* in the workplace which belongs to enterprise systems of internal job regulation. This may extend over many other subjects and workers other than craftsmen.
15. For examples of these safeguards see the provisions of Section 3 of the Wages Council Act, 1959.
16. The organisation of employees is an indispensable condition. Whether employers need to be organised is a condition contingent on the structure of the industry and on the viability of plant agreements.
17. In New Zealand union membership is legally enforced and in Canada union recognition by employers. In Ceylon and in other countries collective agreements are given the force of law.
18. The Coal Mines (Minimum Wage) Act, 1912, and the Cotton Manufacturing Industry (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1934, were examples of legislation permitting the legal enforcement of substantive wage agreements. On one occasion, under the Railways Act, 1921, a procedural agreement was given statutory effect until it was replaced by revised voluntary arrangements in 1935.
19. Under the 'claims' procedure in Section 8 of the Terms and Conditions of Employment Act, 1959.
20. Strictly there are no voluntary rules if by that is meant that an individual is free to disregard them with impunity. All rules need to be upheld by sanctions or they cease to be rules. Voluntary here means the absence of legal compulsion, though the parties may have powerful sanctions of their own to enforce their autonomous rules.
21. 1961 ed., pp. 134–5.
22. In certain circumstances striking *in breach of contract* is a criminal offence for merchant seamen; for employees in the public utility industries of gas, water and electricity; and for any workers whose action causes danger to life or valuable property.

23. O. Kahn-Freund, 'Labour Law' in *Law and Opinion in England in the 20th Century*, Stevens, 1959, pp. 262–3.
24. In recent years the spread of long-term (three or two years) agreements has modified this earlier practice.
25. Conflicts of interest are disputes over *changes* in the existing provisions of collective agreements, while conflicts of right are about the application, interpretation or observance of these provisions. The latter become justiciable disputes when collective agreements are made legally binding; a reason for clearly separating them from the former.
26. Over the two post-war decades 1944–53 and 1954–63 the annual averages were respectively 2.2 and 3.9 million working days lost. (*Ministry of Labour Gazette*, April 1964, p. 145.) Even the higher figure only amounts to 1½ working hours a year per employed person.
27. Apart from the short period from 1917 to 1919 when wages were virtually subject to state regulation.
28. In the words of the Fourth (and final) Report of the Council on Prices, Productivity and Incomes (July 1961), p. 3.
29. 'Inequalities and other anomalies are tolerated so long as they are the result of private arrangement. But Governments, rather optimistically, are expected to be consistent, and to base their administrative action on generally accepted social or moral principles.' (Henry Clay, *The Problem of Industrial Relations*, Macmillan, 1929, p. 67.)
30. In the concluding words of the Fourth Report of the Council on Prices, Productivity and Incomes, *op. cit.*, p. 29: 'The sources of opposition are . . . a strong attachment to principles learned the hard way in a world very different from the one we live in. . . . At the heart of the problem of inflation under full employment is a frame of mind.'
31. 'The Wages Structure and Some Implications for Incomes Policy', *National Institute Economic Review*, November 1962, p. 42.
32. In industries covered by the Ministry of Labour's earnings and hours inquiries. See, E. G. Whybrew, 'Overtime and the Reduction of the Working Week: A Comparison of British and Dutch Experience', *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, July 1964, p. 153.
33. H. A. Turner, *The Trend of Strikes*, Leeds U.P., 1963, pp. 18–19.
34. See Emily Clark Brown, 'Interests and Rights of Soviet Industrial Workers and the Resolution of Conflict', *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, January 1963. 'The "collective" in any Soviet enterprise, manual and non-manual workers alike, find their conditions controlled in great detail by central decisions. Yet considerable scope remains for local decisions.' (p. 264.) 'Soviet informants often talked of how workers when dissatisfied can and do "call meetings and make a fuss" until their complaints are met.' (p. 271.)
35. As is shown by James W. Kuhn in *Bargaining in Grievance Settlement* (Columbia U.P., 1961).
36. It was an American, A. M. Ross, in *Trade Union Wage Policy* (California U.P., 1953), who first drew attention to the 'coercive comparisons' which 'play a large and often dominant role. . . in the determination of wages under collective bargaining.'
37. The concluding words of my contribution on 'Collective Bargaining' in *The System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain*, edited by Flanders and Clegg, Blackwell, 1954.
38. Robert Neild, 'New functions: new men?', *The Listener*, 27th August, 1964, p. 303.
39. *Bulletin*, British Employers' Confederation, 1st July, 1964, p. 1.
40. See pages 89–93.
41. Neil W. Chamberlain, *Collective Bargaining*, McGraw-Hill, 1951, p. 450.
42. *ibid.*, p. 451.
43. *ibid.*, p. 455.
44. For further discussion of the concept of 'productivity bargaining', see Allan Flanders, *The Fawley Productivity Agreements*, Faber, 1964, pp. 238–48.
45. See *op. cit.*, p. 250.
46. The Webbs' idea, that by legal enactment a universal labour code would guarantee every worker certain fundamental rights as to income, leisure and treatment in industry, may have been false prophecy for the first half of the twentieth century; it is not to be dismissed for the second. We are already moving in that direction.

THE INTERNAL SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF INDUSTRY

1. Theodore Levitt, 'The Dangers of Social Responsibility', *Harvard Business Review*, Sept.–Oct., 1958.
2. Wallace B. Donham (in his foreword to Elton Mayo's *The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilisation*, Harvard U.P., 1945, p. ix) suggested this work showed 'that it is within the power of industrial administrations to create within industry itself a partially effective substitute for the old stabilising effect of the neighbourhood. Given stable employment, it might make of industry (as of the small town during most of our national life) a socially satisfying way of life as well as way of making a living.' Frank Tannenbaum in *A Philosophy of Labor* (Knopf, 1952, pp. 198–9) envisages a similar result being achieved by the merging of the business corporation and the trade union ('the only true society that industrialism has fostered'), so that they 'cease to be a house divided' and 'a common identity may once again come to rule the lives of men'.
3. Michael P. Fogarty, *Personnel Management*, March 1963.
4. Norman Ross, *The Democratic Firm*, Fabian Research Series 242, 1964, p. 21.
5. Many employment practices exist as workplace conventions and are

upheld by workers without any formal trade union support. Regulation of output has been shown to exist in unorganised firms.

6. T. H. Marshall, *Sociology at the Crossroads and Other Essays*, Heinemann, 1963, p. 98.
7. Frank Tannenbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 140.
8. Lord Eustace Percy in the Riddell Lecture for 1944: 'The Unknown State.'
9. Lord Denning in an Address to the Assembly of College Faculties, University College, London, *Daily Telegraph*, 27 June 1958.
10. George Goyder, *The Responsible Company*, Blackwell, 1961, p. 81.
11. C. A. R. Crosland, *The Corporation and Modern Society*, Harvard University Press, 1959, p. 274.
12. The results were published in Allan Flanders, Ruth Pomeranz and Joan Woodward, *Experiment in Industrial Democracy–A Study of the John Lewis Partnership*, Faber, 1968.
13. Wilfred Brown, *Exploration in Management*, Heinemann, 1960, Ch. XIV and p. 276.
14. W. M. Blumenthal, *Codetermination in the German Steel Industry*, Princeton University Press, 1956, p. 110.
15. 'It seems to take more power from employers than it really does.' Clark Kerr, 'The Trade Union Movement and the Redistribution of Power in Postwar Germany', *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, November 1954, p. 558.
16. George Goyder, *op. cit.*, p. 90.
17. Neil Chamberlain, *Labor*, McGraw-Hill, 1958, pp. 226–8.
18. *ibid.*, pp. 230–1.
19. Norman Ross, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
20. Michael P. Fogarty, 'Co-Determination and Company Structure in Germany', *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, March 1964, p. 89.
21. Benjamin M. Selekman, *A Moral Philosophy for Management*, McGraw-Hill Paperbacks, 1959, p. 165.
22. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Industrial Democracy*, Longmans, 1902 ed., p. 850.
23. H. A. Clegg, *A New Approach to Industrial Democracy*, Blackwell, 1960, p. 119.
24. *ibid.*, p. 120.
25. *ibid.*, p. 134.
26. *ibid.*, p. 121.
27. Trist, Higgin, Murray & Pollock, *Organisational Choice*, Tavistock, 1963, p. 294.
28. Douglas McGregor, *The Human Side of Enterprise*, McGraw-Hill 1960, p. 33.
29. *ibid.*, pp. 47–8.
30. Quoted by Richard Cabot in 'Mary Parker Follett, an Appreciation', *Radcliffe Quarterly*, April 1934.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: PRESCRIPTION FOR CHANGE

1. Evidence of the Ministry of Labour, paras. 129–33, pp. 38–9. (All subsequent references to Evidence are to published written evidence submitted to the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations.)
2. These proportions are based on information on the coverage of collective agreements supplied by the Ministry of Labour. They cannot be taken to indicate more than rough orders of magnitude.
3. The result may be seen in union membership. In national and local government and some of the nationalised industries more than four out of every five white-collar workers are members of trade unions, while in private manufacturing the proportion is less than one in eight (G. S. Bain, 'The Growth of White-Collar Unionism in Great Britain,' *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, November 1966, p. 321).
4. Ministry of Labour, *op. cit.*, para. 15, p. 117.
5. See p. 96.
6. The National Arbitration Tribunal and later the Industrial Disputes Tribunal, which made its last awards in 1959.
7. Evidence of the Confederation of British Industry, para. 113, p. 24.
8. 'Can Britain have a Wage Policy?' *Scottish Journal of Political Economy*, June 1958, p. 119.
9. The outstanding characteristic of the national pay structure is the rigidity of its relationships' (Guy Routh, *Occupation and Pay in Great Britain 1906–60*, Cambridge U.P., 1965, p. 147).
10. 'Is Britain a Half-time Country?', *Sunday Times*, 1 March, 1964.
11. There, following union recognition, they take the place of district and national agreements, except in cases where multi-plant company agreements are signed.
12. *Ministry of Labour Gazette*, February 1963.
13. *Financial Times*, 7th June, 1966.
14. See the section on 'Roots of Managerial Irresponsibility', especially pp. 253–5, in *The Fawley Productivity Agreements*, Faber, 1964.
15. For a fuller statement of the ideological causes see Alan Fox, 'Managerial Ideology and Labour Relations', *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, November 1966.
16. The evidence suggests that most local strikes are either over money (piecework prices, supplementary rates and bonus payments) or over dismissals, recognition, changes in work and complaints about conditions, etc. Both categories usually reflect a lack of agreed rules.
17. K. W. Wedderburn, *The Worker and the Law*, MacGibbon & Kee, 1965, p. 11.
18. See p. 112.
19. The I.L.O. comparison for the decade 1955–64 shows only West Germany, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and

Switzerland with lower figures, while those for the United States were more than three times as great.

20. On a claim by the National Union of Vehicle Builders early in 1965 which complained of dismissals and refusal to consult union officials.
21. According to McCarthy and Clifford ('The Work of Industrial Courts of Inquiry', *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, March 1966, p. 44) there have been nine Courts out of a total seventy-five, since the passing of the 1919 Industrial Courts Act, in which union recognition has been the principal issue in dispute. The Ministry of Labour in its Evidence (paras. 27–8, p. 99) points out that in recent years '30 per cent of the differences on which conciliation takes place relate to questions of union recognition', and shows why this is often 'not a satisfactory method' for settling such disputes.
22. The text is given in the Evidence of the Ministry of Labour, pp. 133–40.
23. *ibid.*, pp. 130 f.
24. A similar suggestion is included in the Ministry of Labour's Evidence (para. 48, pp. 85 f.) but it is coupled, in my view mistakenly, with the idea that this might be one of the possible functions of a labour court.
25. As is suggested in the Ministry of Labour's Evidence (para. 49, p. 86).
26. *ibid.*, p. 117.
27. *ibid.*
28. See F. J. Bayliss, *British Wages Councils*, Blackwell, 1962, pp. 138–41, and McCormick and Turner in 'The Legal Minimum Wage, Employers and Unions: an Experiment' (*Manchester School*, September 1957) who concluded: 'The real risk of the statutory system is . . . that it may make trade unions lazy' (p. 316).
29. Flanders and Clegg (ed.), *The System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain*, Blackwell, 1954, p. 63.
30. These have been clearly stated by Daniel H. Gray in *Manpower Planning*, Institute of Personnel Management, 1966.
31. Brought together and summarised in its *General Report, April 1965 to July 1966* (No. 19, Cmnd. 3087).
32. Schedule 2, para. 11, *Prices and Incomes Act*.
33. See its report on *Productivity and Pay during the Period of Severe Restraint* (No. 23, Cmnd. 3167).
34. No. 16, Cmnd. 3012. 'We consider . . . that pay settlements in the bus industry should not primarily be directed to attracting more labour for the practical reason that in an area of general labour shortage pay adjustments designed to do this are likely to be ineffective. The most effective remedy for an undertaking suffering from a shortage of labour in such an area is to make better use of labour which it already has' (p. 30).
35. There would have to be different targets for men and for women. But the objective of equal pay for equal work could be approached by gradually reducing the difference in stages.
36. Including measures for redistribution between wage and non-wage incomes, but these lie outside the scope of my essay.

37. Cmnd. 3073. The statutory powers embodied in Part IV of the Prices and Incomes Act were said to be necessary 'to deter the selfish minority who are not prepared to co-operate'.
38. In his personal evidence to the Royal Commission.
39. Hilde Behrend, Harriet Lynch and Jean Davies, in *A National Survey of Attitudes to Inflation and Incomes Policy* (Occasional Papers in Social and Economic Administration, No. 7, Edutext Publications, 1966), which was taken before the standstill, found that of 581 respondents capable of some attempt at describing the Government's incomes policy, 57·6 per cent believed that it could not be successful on a voluntary basis. Their reasons for this belief were overwhelmingly that people were too selfish, greedy, or unwilling to co-operate. Given that incomes policy would not be accepted voluntarily, more people were in favour of legal enforcement than were against it. The tone of this response was supported by surveys carried out after the introduction of the standstill for the *Sunday Times* (4 September, 1966) and the *Daily Telegraph* (5 September, 1966). In both surveys, about 60 per cent of the respondents supported the standstill.
40. *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain*, Longmans, 1920, p. 272.
41. Evidence of the Trades Union Congress, para. 134, pp.50–1.
42. Slichter *et al.*, *The Impact of Collective Bargaining on Management*, Brookings Institution, 1960, p. 497.
43. A form of measured day work designed to give a stable wage in return for a steady level of performance which retains an incentive for workers to raise their performance by means of a graded pay structure. Within limits they can choose a higher or lower wage for a higher or lower level of performance.
44. It should be noted that the distinction which is often drawn between methods or systems of payment and pay structures is at bottom artificial and misleading. The structure itself can have an incentive (or disincentive) effect on performance. One way of rewarding learning, for example, is by having a suitable graded wage structure which induces workers to acquire additional knowledge and skill in order to increase their pay by up-grading.
45. Robert Dubin, 'Constructive Aspects of Industrial Conflict', *Industrial Conflict*, McGraw-Hill, 1954, p. 44.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

1. R. H. Tawney, *The Attack and Other Papers*, Allen and Unwin, 1953, p. 136.
2. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Industrial Democracy*, Longmans, 1902 ed., p.v.

3. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *The History of Trade Unionism 1666–1920*, Longmans, 1920 ed., p. 1.
4. See particularly Ch. XIII on 'The Assumptions of Trade Unionism'.
5. *The History*, *op. cit.*, p. 141. The Webbs had access to the original correspondence with employers on which Nassau Senior based an unpublished, government-commissioned report in 1830. The most interesting feature of the correspondence, they said, was 'the extent to which the employers complained of the manner in which their rivals incited, and even subsidised, strikes against attempted reductions of rates. The mill owner, whose improved processes gave him an advantage in the market, found any corresponding reduction of piecework rates resisted, not only by his own operatives, but by all the other manufacturers in the district, who sometimes went so far as to publish a joint declaration that any such reduction was "highly inexpedient". The evidence, in fact, from Nassau Senior's point of view, justified his somewhat remarkable proposal to punish employers for conniving at combinations'.
6. *Industrial Democracy*, *op. cit.*, p. 173.
7. *ibid.*, p. 174.
8. *ibid.*, p. 179.
9. R. Maciver and C. H. Page, *Society*, Macmillan, 1953, p. 474.
10. *Industrial Democracy*, *op. cit.*, p. 704.
11. *ibid.*
12. *Society*, *op. cit.*
13. They concluded that the device of restriction of numbers had economic advantages and disadvantages, but society–they mistakenly claimed–was 'fortunately saved from so embarrassing a choice' because its 'effective use . . . is no longer practicable' (p. 713). The device of the common rule, in contrast, was 'positively conducive to national efficiency and national wealth' and in its 'universal and elaborate application . . . the economist finds a sound and consistent theory of trade unionism'. (p. 795).
14. As pointed out by W. Milne-Bailey, *Trade Unions and the State*, Allen and Unwin, 1934, p. 86.
15. The Webbs' summary of the 'fundamental object' of trade unionism, *Industrial Democracy*, *op. cit.*, p. 867.
16. This was the substance of their 'Trade Union Theory' in Part III of *Industrial Democracy*, although they also considered some political questions about the relationship between trade unionism and democracy in their final chapter.
17. Selig Perlman, *A Theory of the Labor Movement*, Kelley, 1949, p. 173.
18. I take this description of one of the 'essential characteristics of collective bargaining' from Frederick Harbison, in *Industrial Relations: Challenges and Responses*, ed. J. H. G. Crispo, University of Toronto Press, 1966, p. 61.
19. W. Milne-Bailey, *Trade Union Documents*, Bell, 1929, p. 211.

20. David L. Cole, 'Government in the Bargaining Process: The Role of Mediation', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, January 1961, pp. 48 f.
21. *Cf.* John T. Dunlop, *Collective Bargaining: Principles and Cases*, Irwin, 1949, p. 67.
22. They claimed that where the machinery for collective bargaining has broken down 'we usually discover that this distinction has not been made'. *Industrial Democracy*, *op. cit.*, pp. 182–3.
23. George W. Taylor, 'Effectuating the Labor Contract through Arbitration', *Labor Relations Reports*, Vol. 21, p. 19. Quoted in *International Labour Review*, October 1960, p. 312.
24. *Industrial Democracy*, *op. cit.*, p. 797.
25. *Cf.* J. W. F. Rowe, '. . . the influence of custom may be said to have constituted the real basis of the trade union standard rate. The standard rate was not an original conception of trade unionism: it was essentially the means whereby principles which custom stamped as right and proper, were solidified into a system, which it was the function of trade unionism to maintain as rigidly as possible', *Wages in Practice and Theory*, Routledge, 1928, p. 156.
26. Edward H. Chamberlin on 'Labor Union Power and the Public Interest' in *The Public Stake in Union Power*, ed. P. D. Bradley, University of Virginia Press, 1959, p. 9.
27. Sumner H. Slichter, *Union Policies and Industrial Management*, Brookings Institution, 1941, p. 1.
28. Frank Tannenbaum, *A Philosophy of Labor*, Knopf, 1952, p. 145.
29. T. H. Marshall, *Sociology at the Crossroads and other essays*, Heinemann, 1963, p. 98.
30. *Industrial Democracy*, *op. cit.*, p. 184.
31. Concern for the viability of the institution was a central point in M. W. Reder's attempt to bridge the Dunlop–Ross controversy in 'The Theory of Union Wage Policy', reproduced in *Labor and Trade Unionism: an interdisciplinary reader*, edited by Galeson and Lipset, Wiley, 1960. He argued that *de facto* agreement on comparisons to be treated as relevant in wage negotiations was the 'hall-mark of "mature" collective bargaining', because this gave the parties terms of reference that enabled them regularly to conduct their 'bargaining duel' and yet diminish the risks of stoppage which could be costly to both. But economic limits did eventually assert themselves because: 'If the wage pattern within which a given firm finds itself is incompatible with its long-run economic survival, the firm will either break out of this pattern or disappear.' (p. 14.)
32. Arthur M. Ross, *Trade Union Wage Policy*, University of California, Press, 1948, was written in reply to John T. Dunlop, *Wage Determination under Trade Unions*, Macmillan, New York, 1944. See also Dunlop's response in the Preface to the 1950 edition of his book.
33. An excellent summary of the main arguments and conclusions to date

can be found in the first chapter of Harold M. Levinson, *Determining Forces in Collective Wage Bargaining*, Wiley, New York, 1966.
34. For a critical view see: K. G. J. C. Knowles and E. M. F. Thorne on 'Wage Rounds, 1948–1959' and Knowles and D. Robinson on 'Wage Rounds and Wage Policy', *Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Statistics*, February 1961 and May 1962.
35. Ross, *op. cit.*, p. 50.
36. Barbara Wootton, *The Social Foundations of Wage Policy*, Allen and Unwin, 1955, p. 68: 'Pay and prestige are closely linked; and (in spite of some exceptions) it is the rule that the high-prestige person should also be the highly paid person. . . . Once this rule is admitted as a factor in its own right, it is remarkable how effectively it explains much that, on a purely economic hypothesis, has to be explained away.'
37. Wootton, *op. cit.*, concluded that at present 'the weight of the social influences . . . falls overwhelmingly on the side of conservatism' (p. 12) and referred to them as 'static' (p. 164). J. R. Hicks in reply suggested that 'custom is the static and equality the dynamic element' in collective wage determination ('Economics Foundations of Wage Policy', *Economic Journal*, September 1955). But *outraged* custom can be a very dynamic factor. It was only a force for stability when it provided a universally accepted and unchallenged standard.
38. Levinson, *op. cit.*, p. 272. Political variables are taken to be internal and external trade union (and employer) rivalries (i.e. political competition) as with Ross. The collective bargaining situations analysed and compared are in six industries on the Pacific Coast of the United States covering the period 1945–1962. The effect of the environmental factors is considered on wage *rates* and *major fringe benefits*.
39. *ibid.*, p. 276.
40. *ibid.*, p. 269.
41. Milton Derber *et al.*, *Plant Union-Management Relations: From Practice to Theory*, University of Illinois, 1965, p. 70.
42. For a statement of how management's behaviour in collective bargaining may be influenced by its 'frame of reference' see: Alan Fox, *Industrial Sociology and Industrial Relations*, Research Papers 3, Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations, HMSO, 1966.
43. Neil W. Chamberlain, 'The Union Challenge to Management Control', *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, January 1963, p. 188.
44. Neil W. Chamberlain, *Collective Bargaining*, McGraw-Hill, 1951. The second and substantially revised edition of this book appeared in 1965 with James W. Kuhn as joint author.
45. Chamberlain, 1951 edition, *op. cit.*, p. 121.
46. *ibid.*
47. William M. Leiserson, 'Constitutional Government in American Industries', *American Economic Review*, Vol. 12, Supplement, 1922, p. 61.

48. Chamberlain, *op. cit.*, p. 137.
49. *ibid.*, p. 130.
50. Neil W. Chamberlain, *The Union Challenge to Management Control*, Harper, 1948, p. 198. This earlier work contains the fullest exposition of the managerial theory and of the 'functional integration' of management and unions which the author then envisaged as the logical outcome of the evolution of collective bargaining.
51. Chamberlain, *Collective Bargaining*, *op. cit.*, pp. 128–9.
52. *ibid.*, p. 135.
53. In the second edition of *Collective Bargaining* it is renamed the 'industrial relations' concept and the earlier stress on three theories is replaced by a reference to 'three viewpoints' which 'are not necessarily conflicting'. (p. 113.)
54. Sumner H. Slichter, James J. Healy and E. Robert Livernash, *The Impact of Collective Bargaining on Management*, Brookings Institution, 1960, p. 948.
55. Chamberlain, 1951 edition, *op. cit.*, p. 153. The wording in Chamberlain and Kuhn, 1965 edition, is 'a guide for administrative action within the firm' (p. 131).
56. *ibid.*, p. 154.
57. *ibid.*, p. 157.
58. Joseph I. Roper, *Joint Consultation and Responsibility in Modern Industry*, Study Outline 19, Workers' Educational Association, 1950, pp. 34–5.
59. Neil W. Chamberlain, *Labor*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1958, p. 232.
60. *ibid.*, p. 228.
61. *ibid.*, p. 226.
62. *ibid.*, p. 252.
63. John T. Dunlop, 'The Social Utility of Collective Bargaining', in *Challenges to Collective Bargaining*, ed. Lloyd Ulman, Prentice-Hall, 1967, p. 173.
64. See James W. Kuhn, *Bargaining in Grievance Settlement*, Columbia University Press, 1961 and for a definition of 'fractional bargaining', pp. 79–82.
65. See W. E. J. McCarthy, *The Role of Shop Stewards in British Industrial Relations*, Research Papers 1, Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations, HMSO, 1966; and on the 'methods and effects of shop steward bargaining', pp. 16–37.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: FROM DONOVAN TO DURKHEIM

1. *Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations 1965–1968: Report*, Cmnd. 3623.
2. *In Place of Strife–A Policy for Industrial Relations*, Cmnd. 3888.

3. *Fair Deal at Work*, Conservative Political Centre, April 1968, p. 61.
4. *NOP Bulletin–July 1968 Special Supplement: Trade Unionism*, National Opinion Polls Ltd., 1968. Later polls tell a similar story. An enquiry conducted by the Opinion Research Centre of the *Sunday Times* (5 January 1969), after leakage of the Government's White Paper proposals, showed 62 per cent of a random sample of union members in favour of secret ballots before official strikes, and 57 per cent favouring the imposition of a cooling-off period on unofficial strikes, with 65 per cent supporting legally binding agreements. A survey of non-Conservative voters in England towards the end of 1968 also showed that 62 per cent of them were in favour of making unofficial strikes illegal as compared with 31 per cent against. Among 'Constant Labour' voters, i.e. those who both voted Labour in 1966 and intend to do so again at the next General Election, there was an even higher majority of 64 per cent. (*Socialist Commentary*, February 1969, p. 30).
5. W. J. Ashley, *The Adjustment of Wages*, Longmans, 1903, pp. 20 f.
6. *Report*, *op. cit.*, p. 291.
7. C. Wright Mills, *The New Men of Power*, Harcourt Brace, 1948, p. 9.
8. 'Many firms have no such policy and perhaps no conception of it'. *Report*, *op. cit.*, p. 25.
9. John T. Dunlop, 'The Social Utility of Collective Bargaining' in *Challenges to Collective Bargaining* (ed. L. Ulman), Prentice-Hall, 1967, p. 173.
10. *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 11, Macmillan and The Free Press, 1968, p. 204.
11. As John T. Dunlop showed in his pioneering work *Industrial Relation Systems*, Holt, 1958.
12. For other principles see pp. 94–9.
13. E. Durkheim, *Suicide*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952, p. 253.
14. A. Kornhauser, R. Dubin and A. M. Ross, *Industrial Conflict*, McGraw-Hill, 1954, p. 40.
15. *ibid.*, p. 44.
16. *ibid.*, p. 45.
17. See pp. 163–5.
18. The apparently growing momentum of the demand for equal pay for women in industry is a contemporary illustration of how a stronger assertion of only partially-realised normative aspirations may generate new forms of social competition.
19. E. Durkheim, *The Division of Labour in Society*, Free Press: Collier Macmillan, 1964, p. 3.
20. *Suicide*, *op. cit.*, p. 253.
21. In practical terms this can mean little more than legally enforcing the 'peace obligation' in existing and largely outmoded procedural agreements.
22. *ibid.*, p. 251.

23. Henry Clay, *The Problem of Industrial Relations*, Macmillan, 1929, pp. 12–16.
24. By the end of the war the provisions for compulsory arbitration had resulted in what was virtually state regulation of wages.
25. *ibid.*, p. 78.
26. *ibid.*, p. 153.
27. Under the Trade Boards Act, 1918, and the Industrial Courts Act, 1919.
28. Ian G. Sharp, *Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration in Great Britain*, Allan and Unwin, 1950, p. 330. From 1921 until the Second World War only one new council was created.
29. Though two of them (in 1924 and in 1934) passed their second reading. See Sharp, *op. cit.*, pp. 333 f.
30. The Cotton Manufacturing Industry (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1934 was introduced to prevent, in the words of the prior Board of Inquiry, 'the possible collapse of the whole principle of collective bargaining' in the industry. In addition, statutory wage regulation was extended in 1938 and 1939, as a result of the establishment of new Trade Boards for the furniture, baking and rubber industries (at the request of employers and trade unions) and the passing of the Road Haulage Wages Act.
31. Clay, *op. cit.*, p. 77.
32. The provisions of the Conditions of Employment and National Arbitration Order (Order 1305) of 1940 may have been accepted by the unions as an alternative to state control of wages, but the restrictions imposed on the right to strike and lockout resulted inevitably in publicly-imposed settlements of major wage disputes and the application of a national policy.
33. *In Place of Strife*, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
34. *ibid.*, p. 33.
35. National Board for Prices and Incomes, Report No. 83, *Job Evaluation*, Cmnd. 3772, 1968, p. 12.
36. Practical examples of this model are already available in the national agreements concluded, for example, in the chemical and rubber industries.
37. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain*, Longmans, 1920, p. 272.
38. See p. 193.

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1. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (ed. and trans.), *From Max Weber–Essays in Sociology*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1948, p. 296.
2. R. F. Hoxie, *Trade Unionism in the United States*, Appleton, 1921, p. 34.